Addressees, Institutions, and Goals of the British Propaganda

To this day, 91 years after the end of hostilities, the First World War still holds a special place in the European Consciousness. The name was already coined during the hostilities, based partly on the enormous casualties, but also on the impression in 1914/15 that it would be “The War that will End War” (H. G. Wells in 1915) no matter how high the price of victory would be.

Sadly, it wasn't what Wells hoped it to be. Instead, it further divided the European powers and, while itself being a cataclysm shaped by years and years of growing nationalism and only rarely controlled arms build-up, it lead to more of the same and, finally, resulted in the even bigger catastrophe of World War II.

One of the factors that exacerbated these nationalist and confrontational streaks in European politics was certainly the institutionalisation of propaganda as a means to mobilise the people's willingness to fight and, as a result, energise the nations' economies and military machineries. Particularly effective were the efforts of the British propaganda, that were brought heavily upon the British population as well as on those few nations not already involved in the “Great War”, especially the USA. After our first look at the war and the reasons for Britain to join in on the French side, I will use this post to analyse the British propaganda effort by shedding light on its addressees and goals, as well as the organisations that stood behind it. Because this topic took considerably more space than I originally thought, I will follow this up with a post on the major themes and topics that were exploited for the anti-German propaganda and finish the series in a fourth post that will give a quick summary and take a look at the long-term effects on both the British and the German psyche brought about by World War I and its propaganda.

Propaganda

The practise of propaganda, especially during the first half of the last century, where it was repeatedly employed to justify wars and legitimate (often totalitarian) governments, has evoked a host of different analyses. Most important for this analysis are those by Ramsden[2]; the listing by Anne Morelli[3], who systematises the techniques employed by propaganda (the next post will take a closer look at this); the work by Michael Sanders and Philip Taylor[4], who place an emphasis on the development of the organisation as well as on methods, content and distribution; and the enormous work by Phillip Knightley[5], who delineates the propagandistic involvement of the war correspondents and the press in the official efforts. Of course, the manifesto by Arthur Ponsonby[6] is another of the major works in this area, his political agenda notwithstanding. Among the main historical sources were, again, Ponsonby, as well as several issues of The Times of London that can be comfortably accessed via their excellent archive website. Another obvious choice was the so-called Bryce Report[7], the significance of which I will show later.

The history of propaganda, like that of war reporting in the news media, contains a good deal of myths – not surprisingly, since the subject-matter itself is primarily concerned with myth-making and falsification[8]. This holds especially true for the propaganda of the First World War, where it was for the first time organised by the the belligerents themselves and converted into what today is called psy- ops, or psychological warfare9. By seizing the mass media and conducting heavy censorship, combined with the patriotism and anticipatory obedience of most mass media[10], the governments could take control over many aspects of public opinion and rally the people behind the war effort. In Britain, this was primarily achieved by the dissemination of atrocity propaganda, terrifying stories of German cruelties, war crimes, and outrages, an approach that has been called the “British technique” (“britische Methode”[11]), while “an impressive exercise in improvisation”[12], combined with the benefit of a common linguistic and cultural background with the USA, gave Britain a head start in the propaganda war against the central powers[13].

Addressees and Goals

So we already established that deceit was used by the British government at the start of the war as a justification to fight on the side of France. But who, exactly, were the addressees for this propaganda effort, and what, precisely, was the perceived benefit of lying to the public?

In pre-war Britain, pacifism had its mainstays in the churches, the (Independent) Labour Movement and the radical wing of the Liberal Party. All three enjoyed broad support for their anti-war stance, and the churches and Labour had an international orientation that inhibited the acceptance of nationalistic ideology. Especially Labour with its associated newspapers (Manchester Guardian (nowadays just The Guardian, Daily News and Labour Leader) also had a more class-oriented, socialist view on a possible war: Capitalists would be the only group to profit from war, whereas the workers would be the ones sent onto the field of battle[14]. As Arthur Ponsonby writes:

Falsehood is a recognised and extremely useful weapon in warfare, and every country uses it quite deliberately to deceive its own people, to attract neutrals, and to mislead the enemy.[15]

As can be easily seen, Ponsonby distinguishes three different consignees: the (British) people, neutral nations, and the Germans. Most of the propaganda effort conducted was aimed at the first two and served two particular goals: At home (as well as, of course, in the Armed Services), morale and determination for fighting the war should be strengthened; furthermore, any opposition against the war itself, the increased recruitment, the enormous casualties, and, later on, the conscription, was to be rendered impossible in the face of the claimed moral imperative. Especially the strengthening of the army turned out to be badly needed, as the British, at the beginning of the war, had the smallest contingent of ground troops available to any of the major powers – in 1914, the BEF numbered only about 90,000 men, or 6 divisions, including the reserves. France, as a comparison, mobilised more than 3 million soldiers[16]. Even with the aid of over one year of continuous propaganda, the adoption of the draft proved to be an extraordinary complex issue and was partly to blame for the demise of PM Asquith[17] in 1916. Without propaganda, it might not have been possible to introduce general conscription at all[18].

The second main goal was “to attract neutrals”[19], mainly the USA, Italy and the eastern nations. The case of Italy was especially pressing, since theoretically it would have been obliged to enter the war on the German side, and had, at first, to be encouraged to at least stay neutral. Several propaganda campaigns (e.g. the “corpse factories / Kadaververwertungsanstalten”-publications, that accused Germany of rendering down battlefield fatalities for fat) were started with the explicit purpose to influence specific countries (i.e. the countries in the Far East)[20].

The Misleading of the enemy apparently was not one of the main goals, and only came into being during the last months of the war. Nevertheless did many former military leaders of Germany exaggerate the success and effectiveness of British propaganda in Germany, be it on the front lines or at home, even going so far to ascribe the beginnings of the (ultimately war-ending) Revolution to the enemy leaflets dropped on German soldiers. In reality, however, the Allied propaganda did little to influence the German public, except enraging it at the “spreading [of] misrepresentations and accusations”[21], [22]. It also sparked the now infamous response “An die Kulturwelt” by the German intelligentsia[23].

Organisations

The Committee on Alleged German Outrages (The Bryce Commission)

The Committee on Alleged German Outrages, or, as it is more commonly known, the Bryce Commission, was an ad hoc group headed by the former British ambassador to the USA, Viscount Bryce. During his stay in the US he had gained a strong reputation with the American public and was therefore the perfect candidate to preside over a propaganda organisation whose aim was to gain support for Britain in the USA.

The produced report was a compilation of over 1,200 alleged eye witnesses' accounts (mostly taken from Belgian refugees) of German war crimes committed during the invasion of Belgium. It was published on May 12, 1915, coincidentally (propagandistically speaking: "luckily") just five days after the sinking of the Lusitania[24], to a therefore already enraged public. Its propagandistic nature should have been clear even at that time, however, since it was not only translated into 30 languages and sold at the cost of a newspaper, but also contained a good deal of illustrations by the well-known anti-German Dutch Louis Raemaekers[25] that were clearly of a propagandistic nature[26].

The committee employed highly spurious methods to achieve the desired result: It accepted hearsay and rumours as well-established facts, ignoring any contradictory sources. The members of the committee did not interview a single witness themselves, none of whom was placed under oath, and their names were kept secret. Additionally, all original accounts have vanished from the records, apparently because they were deliberately destroyed[27]. In 1922, a Belgian commission tried to establish the facts but “failed markedly to corroborate a single major allegation”[28] of the report.

Propaganda Institutions[29]

In order to open “a Pandoran box which unleashed the weapon of propaganda upon the modern world”[30], found necessary by the British government to control the public opinion, Britain needed a more institutionalised propaganda machinery than just piecemeal ad hoc committees that were formed whenever need be. This more orderly approach was preceded by several smaller developments even before the war; but only in 1914, and, with the introduction of conscription in 1916, was the need seen to organise the propaganda effort according to the needs of the conduct of a total war[31].

The first governmental propaganda organisation was the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC) that was established as early as August 31, 1914. Although it was more of a policy advisory group, it, too, did conduct propagandistic campaigns aimed at increasing the numbers of volunteers for the military[32]. The Press Bureau was established even earlier, during the first week of August, but initially was not primarily tasked with giving out its own notices, but mainly with censoring the press (and therefore deridingly called the 'Suppress Bureau')[33]. Right from the start, it was headed by F.E. Smith (the future Lord Birkenhead)[34], later followed by Sir Stanley Buckmaster[35], and included such illustrious members as George Riddell[36], later followed by Sir Edward Cook[37], among others[38].

Another organisation assigned to the spreading of propaganda was the Neutral Press Committee. It was formed in September 1914 and represents “one of the earliest examples of [newspapermen] being recruited to serve the official machinery”[39]. The task was mainly press work in the relations to allied as well as neutral countries. It was supported in this by the News Department of the Foreign Office, that especially concentrated its attention on the American press and public[40].

The most important institution, however, was constituted during the first week of September 1914 in Ellington House: The War Propaganda Bureau. It as well was tasked with spreading the propaganda and earning support abroad and, therefore, well-staffed by literary notables such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle[41], H. G. Wells[42] and Arnold Toynbee[43] as well as several newspapermen[44]. It was specifically designed to „[target] opinion-makers rather than opinion itself”[45], a distinguishing difference from the more obviously propagandistic German top-down approach of direct mass-distribution. All over-seas efforts were unified under the auspices of the Foreign Office in 1916[46].

Finally, in January 1917, the whole of the propaganda machinery was combined into the new independent Department of Information, headed first by John Buchan[47]. The different organisations were completely reorganised into four sections (an art and literature section, a press and cinema division, an intelligence section, and an administrative division) to make the processes more effective[48]. Additionally, the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) was founded in May 1917 (officially in August) to strengthen the support of the war within the British populace. It built upon the work and structures of the PRC and managed to send out numerous speakers and representatives inside most of Britain's constituencies by 1918[49]. In February 1918, Lord Northcliffe[50] and Lord Beaverbrook[51] were appointed to take charge of the whole of the official propaganda under the newly established Ministry of Information[52].

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Footnotes

[1] Ferdinand Tönnies: Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung, 1922, p. 552 (German).
[2] John Ramsden: Don't Mention the War. The British and the Germans since 1890, 2006.
[3] Anne Morelli: Die Prinzipien der Kriegspropaganda, 2004 (German).
[4] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982.
[5] Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003.
[6] Arthur Ponsonby: Falsehood in War-Time. Propaganda Lies of the First World War, 1928,
(http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t050824i/ponsonby.html).
[7 Viscount Bryce: The Bryce Report. Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, 1915,
(http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/brycereport.htm).
[8] cf. Thomas Dominikowski: Massenmedien und Massenkrieg. Historische Annäherungen an eine unfriedliche Symbiose, in: Martin Löffelholz (ed.): Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert (Krieg als Medienereignis II), 2004, pp. 59 – 80 (German), and Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003.
[9] cf. Thomas Dominikowski: Massenmedien und Massenkrieg. Historische Annäherungen an eine unfriedliche Symbiose, in: Löffelholz, Martin (ed.): Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert (Krieg als Medienereignis II), 2004, p. 61 (German).
[10] cf. Jan Staiger: Selbstorganisation, Nicht-Linearität, Viabilität. Eine konstruktivistisch-sozialsystemische Perspektive auf Kriegsberichterstattung, in: Martin Löffelholz (ed.): Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert (Krieg als Medienereignis II), 2004, p. 166 (German).
[11] Ferdinand Tönnies: Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung, 1922, p. 552 (German).
[12] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 1.
[13] cf. Thomas Dominikowski: Massenmedien und Massenkrieg. Historische Annäherungen an eine unfriedliche Symbiose, in: Martin Löffelholz (ed.): Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert (Krieg als Medienereignis II), 2004, pp. 66 – 69 (German), and Michael Kunczik: Die Privatisierung der Kriegspropaganda. Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in Kriegszeiten von der Revolution 1776 bis zum Irak-Krieg 2003, in: Martin Löffelholz (ed.): Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert (Krieg als Medienereignis II), 2004, pp. 88 – 91 (German).
[14] cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 1, Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003, p. 85, Paul Michael Kennedy: The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860 – 1914, 1980, pp. 459f.
[15] Arthur Ponsonby: Falsehood in War-Time. Propaganda Lies of the First World War, 1928, Introduction
(http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t050824i/ponsonby.html).
[16] cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, pp. 3, 12,18.
[17] cf. H. C. G. Matthew: Art. 'Asquith, Herbert Henry', in: H. C. G.Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 2 Amos – Avory, 2004, pp. 735 – 754.
[18] cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, pp. 119 – 122, 130f.
[19] Arthur Ponsonby: Falsehood in War-Time. Propaganda Lies of the First World War, 1928, Introduction
(http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t050824i/ponsonby.html).
[20] cf. Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003, pp. 111 – 113., Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 167 – 207, Alan Kramer: “Greueltaten”. Zum Problem der deutschen Kriegsverbrechen in Belgien und Frankreich. In: Gerhard Hirschfeld / Gerd Krumeich / Irina Renz (eds.): Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch. Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkriegs (Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Neue Folge, Vol. 1), 1993, p. 85 (German).
[21] - : An Appeal to the Civilised World! (Manifesto of the 93), 1914, cited after: Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg / Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg: Der Aufruf 'An die Kulturwelt!'. Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1996, p. 163 (German).
[22] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 208 – 245.
[23] cf. Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg / Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg: Der Aufruf 'An die Kulturwelt!'. Das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1996 (German).
[24] cf. Thomas A. Bailey / Paul B. Ryan: The Lusitania Disaster. An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy, 1975.
[25] cf. - : Art. 'Raemaekers, Louis', in: R. C. van Caenegem et al (eds.): Grote Winkler Prins. Encyclopedie in 25 Delen, Vol. 18 gero – rano, 1982, p. 552 (Dutch).
[26] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 264, Alan Kramer: “Greueltaten”. Zum Problem der deutschen Kriegsverbrechen in Belgien und Frankreich. In: Gerhard Hirschfeld / Gerd Krumeich / Irina Renz (eds.): Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch. Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkriegs (Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Neue Folge, Vol. 1), 1993, pp. 85f. (German).
[27] cf. Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003, pp. 87 – 89.
[28] Phillip Knightley: The First Casualty. The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq, 2003, p. 88.
[29] Within this blog entry I can only give a sketchy overview of the propaganda institutions created during the war. Some organisations, like the Department of Enemy Propaganda at Crewe House (cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 89 – 97), I chose to omit completely. For a more detailed account see Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982,, especially the organisational charts in the appendices, pp 266 – 271.
[30] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 1.
[31] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 59 – 63, Florian Altenhöner: Kommunikation und Kontrolle. Gerüchte und städtische Öffentlichkeit in Berlin und London 1914 / 1918 (Publications of the German Historical Institute London, Vol. 62), 2008, pp. 59 – 63 (German).
[32] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 16 – 18.
[33] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 19 – 25, Florian Altenhöner: Kommunikation und Kontrolle. Gerüchte und städtische Öffentlichkeit in Berlin und London 1914 / 1918 (Publications of the German Historical Institute London, Vol. 62), 2008, pp. 63 – 65 (German).
[34] cf. John Campbell: Art. 'Smith, Frederick Edwin, first earl of Birkenhead', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 51 Smillie – Sprott, 2004, pp. 113 – 119.
[35] cf. William Goodhart: Art. 'Buckmaster, Stanley Owen, first Viscount Buckmaster', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 8 Brown – Burstow, 2004, pp. 541 – 543.
[36] cf. A. J. A. Morris: Art. 'Riddell, George Allardice, Baron Riddell', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 46 Randolph – Rippingille, 2004, pp. 905f., Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 29).
[37] cf. A. J. A. Morris: Art. 'Cook, Sir Edward Tyas', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 13 Constable – Crane, 2004 , pp. 92 – 94, Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 25.
[38] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 19 – 25.
[39] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 33.
[40] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 32 – 38.
[41] cf. Owen Dudley Edwards: Art. 'Doyle, Sir Arthur Ignatius Conan', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 16 Dewes – Dryland, 2004, pp. 827 – 830.
[42] cf. Patrick Parrinder: Art. 'Wells, Herbert George', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 58 Wellesley – Wilkinson, 2004, pp. 56 – 61.
[43] cf. Millar, Fergus (2004): Art. 'Toynbee, Arnold Joseph', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 55 Tomson – Usher, 2004, pp. 178 – 185.
[44] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 39.
[45] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 41.
[46] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 43 – 54.
[47] cf. H. C. G. Matthew: Art. 'Buchan, John, first Baron Tweedsmuir', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 8 Brown – Burstow, 2004, pp. 449 – 456.
[48] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 64.
[49] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, pp. 67f.
[50] cf. D. George Boyce: Art. 'Harmsworth, Alfred Charles William, Viscount Northcliffe', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 51 Smillie – Sprott, 2004, pp. 341 – 346.
[51] cf. D. George Boyce: Art. 'Aitken, William Maxwell, first Baron Beaverbrook', in: H. C. G. Matthew / Brian Harrison (eds.): Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. From the earliest times to the year 2000, Vol. 51 Smillie – Sprott, 2004, pp. 537 – 544.
[52] cf. Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 101.