And I can't help but wonder, no Willie McBride,
Do all those who lie here know why they died?
Did you really believe them when they told you "The Cause?"
Did you really believe that this war would end wars?

- Eric Bogle: The Green Fields of France (Dropkick Murphys Version)

Apart from “The Great War of 2077” that brought about the collapse of the (fictional) Fallout-universe, there is only one War that is called “Great”.

To this day, 71 years after the end of hostilities, the First World War still holds a special place in the European Consciousness. The name was already coined during the hostilities, based partly on the enormous casualties, but also on the impression in 1914/15 that it would be “The War that will End War'” (H. G. Wells in 1915) no matter how high the price of victory would be. The then-popularity of the war can in large part be explained by a successful propaganda effort initiated by the British government to legitimate the use of force against Germany. That the effects of this effort can still be felt today is a powerful testimonial to the effectiveness of propaganda [1]. But if the reasons given for Britain's entry into the war on the side of France and Russia were propaganda, what were the real reasons?

In this post I will first introduce to the trigger and cause célèbre of much of the British propaganda: How and why Germany settled on the Schlieffen-Plan that ultimately not only failed to assure its military goal (the anticipated quick victory against France) but also, because of the violation of neutral Belgium, handed Britain the excuse to join the war on the French side on a silver platter. After that, the real motivation for the British government to enter the fight against the Germans will be explained.

“A Plan for Quick Victory in a Short War” [2] The Schlieffen Plan as the Beginning of the First World War in the West

The Great War was thoroughly planned. The German Army had a plan, perhaps the most famous plan in military history since the Trojan horse. The French Army had lots of plans, but had finally settled on Plan XVII. Even the British army had a plan. The Royal Navy pretended to have a plan. The British government had no plan at all, but thought it prudent to adopt one. The plan which the government adopted was that of the British army. This has been the cause of much dispute and recrimination and many have seen in it the seeds of all future disasters. [3]

Historically, Imperial Germany's military policy had long been determined by the potentiality of a two-front war against both France and Britain on a western front and against Russia on an eastern front. This made it necessary to formulate a strategy that, by utilising the well-developed German railway system, allowed to first achieve victory against one opponent and then against the other. The first plan to incorporate this strategy was developed by Field Marshal Alfred Graf von Schlieffen (Chief of the Great German General Staff from 1891 to 1906) from 1892 onwards and finished in 1905. Finally, it was adapted and significantly altered by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke [4].

The plan called for the first assault to take place in the west, against the French and via Belgian territory. This decision for the western front and Belgium as the initial theatre of war was taken under the impression of two separate considerations: First of all, France would need a much shorter time to mobilise its army from peacetime levels to readiness for war, a feat that Russia (because of her vast distances and her inferior railway system) would not likely be able to accomplish. This, it was thought, would allow German troops enough time to first defeat France in a short, decisive campaign before transferring them to the east. Secondly, the war against Russia was thought to last longer than the one against France, as Russia had access to superior numbers of soldiers compared to all other powers in Europe. Belgium then was chosen as the corridor for the German army as it would allow the bulk of the German troops to bypass the strong French border fortresses along the Moselle and Meuse rivers as well as the inaccessible Ardennes woodlands, completing a wheeling movement throughout northern France and capturing Paris within 42 days from mobilisation [5].

Flaws

But the Schlieffen-Plan contained several crucial flaws, militarily as well as politically. From a military-strategic point of view, the plan overestimated the possible speed of advance, mostly because it discounted the resistance by Belgians and the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF). The latter in particular was ignored because there existed no official treaty between Belgium and Britain and no official commitment had been made by the British government to either Belgium or France (the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 was primarily concerned with colonial matters). Unknown to the German military planners was the informal cooperation between the French and British Armies (motivated in part by the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911). Admittedly, there was the 1839 Treaty of Londony by which Britain, Prussia and France guaranteed Belgium's neutrality, but by 1914 it had been “almost forgotten” [6]. Nevertheless was this treaty cited by the British government after the commitment to war [7]

The Schlieffen-Plan also severely underestimated the logistical problems of advancing more than 300,000 men mostly on foot [8] across few and deficient Belgian roads. Not only did the decision by von Moltke to weaken the right wing of his troops in favour of the left make it less likely to close in on large parts of the French army, but the area itself made it physically impossible to complete the plan von Schlieffen had in mind, namely advancing on and capturing Paris – German troops could either advance with sufficient speed or in sufficient force, but not both [9]. Apart from these issues in the west, Russia's faster-than-thought mobilisation also made for challenges in the east for Germany's Army.

The political entanglement was even more disastrous for Germany and “must rank as one of the worst political miscalculations of the century” [10]: The violation of Belgian territory allowed the British government to assume the moral high ground and “the enormous advantage of being able to enter a war in the role of selfless guardian of European treaties” [11]. This alleged protection of a small neutral country was quickly expanded into the official goals of British policy: Firstly, the war was conducted to defend or liberate several smaller countries (especially Belgium and Serbia) from an unjust foreign rule, thereby propagating the same national self-determination President Wilson later included into his famous “14 points” [12]. The seemingly biggest adversary for this, (Prussian) militarism, would be ended once and for all. And, while doing so, democratic governments would be installed in the defeated states to prevent any future aggressions. Britain itself, it was said, would not profit in the least from its selfless involvement in the war.

These sentiments were picked up quickly by the press:

“Germany tried to bribe us with peace to desert our friends and duty. But Great Britain has preferred the path of honour.” - Daily Mirror, Aug 4, 1914

“We are going into a war that is forced upon us as the defender of the weak and the champions of the liberties of Europe.” - The Times, Aug 5, 1914

So, in effect, the violation of Belgium's neutrality (and the approximately 5,500 civilian casualties) permanently stigmatised Germany as the aggressor[13] and gave the British government (as well as, later on, the USA) the excuse it needed to join the French/Belgian side. In other words, “Britain could go to war for France and appear to do so for Belgium” [14], while the British public showed “an impressive display of national unity” [15] .

“What about India and the Mediterranean?” [16] - British Motivation for Entering the War

Britain needed a moral justification for entering the war. This, she found in the German invasion of Belgium, and propaganda was employed to spread it far and wide, so that even “[t]rade unionists responded to Lord Kitchener's call to arms in overwhelming numbers [and units] were formed consisting almost entirely of miners or railwaymen or dockers”[17]. But all of these reasons given above are easily dismissed when scrutinised: “British intervention”, writes Bourne, “[was not] the result of a disinterested attachment to principles of natural justice and international law” [18].

The self-determination of smaller nations could hardly be of importance to Britain when she still had numerous colonies as well as Ireland under her rule. Furthermore, some small nations (e.g. Poland), territories (e.g. the Saar, Alsace-Lorraine, South Tirol) and colonies (e.g. the German possessions in China) were later used as leverage in secret treaties with other countries in order to lure them on the Allied side [19].

Similarly, the paradox between the aim of spreading democracy and the inclusion of Tsarist Russia in the Allied Forces should have been obvious from the beginning. Ultimately, even the claim of setting an end to militarism is, in retrospect, weak, since military spending by the main European powers not only continued, but actually soared during the inter-war period [20].

Power Politics

But if all these moral justifications were untrue, what made the British government give up its policy of 'Splendid Isolation' for good and enter into the war against Germany on France's side? The real motivation for this had little to do with honouring European treaties or standing by Britain's “friends and duty”, on the contrary. It was the result of pure power politics to safeguard British interests in Europe and the Far East:

“Should the war come and England stand aside on of two things must happen: Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia [...]. [But then] what will be the position of friendless England?
“Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?” - Sir Eyre Crowe, July 23, 1914 [21]

This brief note by Sir Eyre Crowe (a staunch anti-German serving in the Foreign Office) elucidates the British position:

She had no choice but to support France and Russia to maintain her own (colonial) interests. A victorious Russia, ungrateful towards a neutral Britain, would pose a potential threat to the British colonies in the Far East, especially India (Russian Turkistan had a common border with Kashmir). An ungrateful France would pose an even greater threat towards British pursuit of hegemony. Not only the continent, but also the Mediterranean, as well as Britain's interests in Africa and further towards the east (France already controlled a majority of shares of the Suez Canal) would be threatened by a hostile France.

A Germany successful in defeating all other continental great powers, on the other hand, further vitalised by its newly-gained access to the vast resources of Russia, would make it impossible for an isolated Britain to oppose it effectively [22]. The decision to go to war, therefore, was only consequential.

“[But] German violation of Belgian neutrality allowed Sir Edward Grey [(the Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of hostilities)] to cloak British foreign policy in an aura of moral respectability […] [and portray the decision for war] as a principled stand against unprovoked German aggression in defence of international obligations and the rights of small nations. [...] Britain could go to war for France and appear to do so for Belgium” [23]

.




Part II of this post takes a deeper look at the British propaganda effort during the First World War, its sources, addressees and goals, as well as the organisations founded for that purpose. Part II will analyse major themes and topics that were exploited. Finally, Part IV will show the results of the anti-German propaganda, both in a short-term and in a long-term perspective.

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Footnotes
[1] cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989: p. 1.
[2] John Keegan: The First World War, 1999, p. 28.
[3] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 9.
[4] cf. John Keegan: The First World War, 1999, pp. 24 – 37; G. Ritter: The Schlieffen Plan, 1958; Michael Barett: A Critical Review of the Schlieffen Plan. In: Pravo: The North American Journal for Central European Studies 2007 (1), pp. 71 – 84 (http://www.pravojournal.org/Barrett.pdf)
[5] cf. John Keegan: The First World War, 1999, p. 31.
[6] Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 11.
[7] cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 5; Michael L. Sanders / Philip M. Taylor: British Propaganda during the First World War 1914 – 1918, 1982, p. 11.
[8] In 1941, the mechanisation of warfare, combined with suitable tactics (the 'Blitzkrieg'), enabled the Wehrmacht to implement an updated version of the Schlieffen-Plan, to much greater effect. cf. John Keegan: The First World War, 1999, p. 71.
[9] cf. John Keegan: The First World War, 1999, p. 36.
[10] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 210.
[11] G. Ritter: The Schlieffen Plan, 1958, p. 88.
[12] cf. John Ramsden: Don't Mention the War. The British and the Germans since 1890, 2006, p. 127.
[13] This was recorded in writing by the infamous “war guilt” Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles.
[14]J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 7.
[15] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 6.
[16] Sir Eyre Crowe, July 23, 1914, cited after J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 6.
[17] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 106.
[18] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 2.
[19] cf. Richard M. Watt: The Tragedy of Germany: Versailles and the German Revolution, 2003, pp. 9 - 105.
[20] cf. Arthur Ponsonby: Falsehood in War-Time. Propaganda Lies of the First World War, 1928, Section 29 (http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t050824i/ponsonby.html).
[21] cited after J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 6.
[22] (cf. J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, pp. 2 – 8; Paul Michael Kennedy: The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860 – 1914, 1980, pp. 441 – 463.
[23] J. M. Bourne: Britain and the Great War 1914 – 1918, 1989, p. 7.